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“I Love People So Terribly”:
Approaching Affectivity with Levinas,
Hillesum, and Christian Theology
Glenn Morrison

PRECIS
Through engaging the writings of two Jewish thinkers, Emmanuel Levinas and Ett y
Hillesum, this essay sets out to develop a Christian theological approach to affectivity.
It begins by introducing Levinas and Hillesum to develop a context for dialogue
between Jewish thought and Christian theology. Initiating a phenomenological foundation, the essay suggests that affectivity resonates through the human condition of
loneliness and otherness. Building on this perspective and aided by Levinas’s thought
and the practical expression of Hillesum’s affectivity of talking to God, the focus turns
to introduce and develop the notions of spontaneity, melancholy, and vigilance. Hence,
it suggests the central elements of a theological approach to human affectivity in Christian living. Accordingly, by seeking to be poor in spirit and offering friendship to the
poor, affectivity becomes a way for the Christian community to live in unity, signifying
the resilience to embrace the turbulence of conversion, the shock of encountering the
other’s suffering, and the joy of loving others “so terribly.”

•
I. Levinas and Hillesum

A

guiding factor throughout this essay as we approach developing affectivity within a phenomenological and theological domain will be the
desire to bring together Christian theology with the writings of two different, yet remarkable Jewish thinkers, Emmanuel Levinas (1906–95) and
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Ett y (Esther) Hillesum (1914–43). Levinas was a French philosopher and
Talmudic scholar, who related that his life and work were “dominated by
the presentiment and the memory of the Nazi horror.”1 Given his familiarity with Judaism and Western philosophy, one could well ask whether he
set out to translate his Judaism and the memory of the Nazi horror into
contemporary philosophy. Certainly, his philosophical discourse culminated in a phenomenology peculiarly sensitive to the sufferings of life and
contributed to the development of a Jewish humanism. His writings have
also appealed to Christian theologians.2 Moreover, Levinas was quite
eager to engage Judaism and Christianity together as he sought to foster
Jewish-Christian friendship in the aftermath of the Shoah. He realized that
the Shoah also deeply affected Christianity. The vocation of Judaism and
Christianity speaks today not only of fi nding common ground for dialogue
but also of moving forward toward friendship, the sharing of scholarship,
and the realization that the other’s suffering is my suffering. For example,
responding to the question, “What is the contribution of Christianity to
the contribution of peace?” Levinas reflected:
I also believe that the trials undergone by humanity over the course of
the twentieth century are, in their horror, not only a measure of human
depravity, but also a renewed reminder of our vocation. I have the impression that they have modified something in us. I am thinking notably that
the Passion of Israel at Auschwitz has profoundly marked Christianity
itself, and that Judeo- Christian friendship is an element of peace in which
the person of John Paul II represents a hope.3

Levinas’s writings, especially as he developed the language of otherness, remains throughout “a renewed reminder of our vocation” to respond
to the excess of evil with the stance of peace. We see this equally in the
warm intimacy of Hillesum’s openness to God from her diary and letters.
In contrast to Levinas, who survived the Shoah, Hillesum was a young
1
Emmanuel Levinas, “Signature,” in Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on
Judaism, tr. Seán Hand (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 291.
2
See Adriaan T. Peperzak, “The Significance of Levinas’s Work for Christian Theology,” in
Jeffrey Bloechel, ed., The Face of the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of
Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), p. 184.
3
“Who Shall Not Prophesy?” (1985), tr. Bettina Bergo, in Jill Robbins, ed., Is It Righteous
to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 226.
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Dutch Jew from Amsterdam, who died at Auschwitz at the age of twentynine in 1943. She left “behind a diary (eleven exercise books) and seventyeight letters which have drawn responses across the world in the form of
books, reviews, articles, documentaries, plays and visual art.”4 In the face
of the destruction of the Jews in Europe, her writings unveil an affectivity
of the heart that evidences an outpouring of love as a means to respond to
the experiences of life and death, as do those of the great mystics and poets.
Moreover, her writings evoke questions within us about the intimacy of
both life and death.5 Th is is all the more compelling, for it reveals how such
a private soul can imbue so much light and grace from the spontaneous
stirrings and conversion of the heart to the melancholy of the soul’s
encounter of the moment of another’s suffering. Hillesum herself had come
to the point of learning to love people so deeply through loving “God
within them.”6 Her radical transformation from the chaos of self-interest to
other-centered (ethical-spiritual) love came through her relationship with
her “spiritual master, Julius Spier” (to whom she refers as “S.”),7 “a Jewish
emigrant from Berlin” and “founder of ‘psychochirology,’ the study and
classification of palm prints.”8
Altogether, Hillesum’s affectivity demonstrates the vigilance of love,
that is to say that, within the loneliness and suffering of life and her intimate care and sensitivity for others, she could reach out to God and proclaim, “You have made me so rich, oh God, please let me share out Your
beauty with open hands.”9 In commenting upon the value of praying “for
persecuted Israel,” Levinas provided an insight into the quality and character of Hillesum’s prayer when he reflected, “this is a prayer for the people
4
Alexandra Pleshoyano, “Etty Hillesum: Love Calls for Spiritual Discernment,” Religious
Studies and Theology, vol. 28, no. 2 (2009), p. 241. Moreover, Michael Downey noted that,
regarding Hillesum, “not a few Catholic theologians . . . have drawn attention to the importance of her writings” (Michael Downey, “Penning Patterns of Transformation: Etty Hillesum
and Thomas Merton,” in Merton Annual: Studies in Culture, Spirituality, and Social Concerns,
vol. 4 (1991), p. 79.
5
See Ingmar Granstedt, “Etty Hillesum: une parole de Dieu dans la Shoah,” Théophilyon 8
( June, 2003): 317–319.
6
Pleshoyano, “Etty Hillesum,” p. 242.
7
Ibid., pp. 242 and 264, n. 2.
8
Jan G. Gaarlandt, “Introduction,” in Etty Hillesum, An Interrupted Life: The Diaries, 1941–
1943; and Letters from Westerbork, tr. Arnold J. Pomerans (New York: Henry Holt and Co.,
1996), p. xiv.
9
Hillesum, An Interrupted Life, p. 332.
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who are called to reveal the glory of God. In praying to God, one prays for
God.”10 Given that “God is the one who suffers the most in human suffering,” 11 we can suggest that, in the outpouring of Hillesum’s “true pain” 12 to
God, we discover a kenotic element of God’s suffering through her prayer,
namely, an expiating voice to “love people so terribly.”13
Keeping Hillesum’s resounding voice in mind as much as Levinas’s radical call of responsibility, let us now construct a lens to develop a Christian
theological approach to affectivity. To this end, we will look fi rst at the
relation between loneliness and otherness as the fi rst stage in looking at
the very phenomenological and existential foundations of affectivity. In a
sense, the tension between loneliness and otherness creates an environment for the self to fi nd a creative and redemptive voice in the midst of pain
and sorrow. An affectivity of otherness then begins to emerge from the
depths of loneliness. The second stage of developing the perspective of
affectivity in theology and Christian living is to put into service three
notions drawn from the philosophy of Levinas, namely, spontaneity, melancholy, and vigilance. Utilizing these notions with both Levinas and
Hillesum, we will endeavor to approach the affectivity of (1) faith in light
of the spontaneity of conversion, (2) hope in the melancholy of encountering the other’s pain and suffering, and (3) love by way of the vigilance of
loving people from the heart. Together, these three notions provide the
central character of affectivity.
Our study then moves toward a third and fi nal stage to begin to touch
upon and explore affectivity with regard to Christian living and praxis.
Accordingly, we aim to develop a sense of affectivity as the joy of forgiveness (Lk. 15:7), being poor in spirit, living in unity, and possessing
the sensitivity and ability to love others so deeply—especially the poor.
Altogether, the ethical and spiritual transformation of being spontaneous,
melancholic, and vigilant signifies the affectivity of a surprising opening of
hearts of the Christian community to the Realm of God, which we fi nd
expressed so eloquently in the humane affectivity of Hillesum’s warm,

10

“Who Shall Not Prophesy?” p. 226; emphasis in original.
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Hillesum, An Interrupted Life, p. 198.
11
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intimate, and resilient words to God, “I love people so terribly, because in
every human being I love something of You.”14

II. Loneliness and Otherness
Loneliness is “one of the most painful human wounds.”15 According to
Levinas, isolation is “rooted” in our “existing” because it cannot be
“exchanged”; we remain “all alone . . . a monad.”16 Loneliness reflects an
inescapable state of being that we are “not the other.”17 In response, for
Levinas, we are called to be “for-the-other,”18 producing a metaxic, turbulent existence, for we are “weighed down” by our lonely existence as much
as placed in a personal drama of truth to create “a new world.”19 In the
epiphany of discovering the “darkness and anguish”20 of loneliness, we
may feel the menacing and stirring presence of a “lack of love”21—blowing
embers, as it were, upon other negative states of mind such as hostility, horror, fear, anxiety, and despair.
Further, the dearth of love may translate into encounters of persecution. Rather than the compassion of seeking to be in the other’s skin, as it
were, peering stares or even ordinary, everyday smiles may result in stripping the other’s skin (human dignity and rights) where “internment” or
“[s]ocial aggression” is at hand.22 Levinas knew this well when he was
imprisoned in Stalag no. II B, a camp in northern Germany for military
prisoners, containing other Jews and at least two Catholic priests. While
doing forced labor in the forest as a woodcutter,23 he encountered the
14

Ibid.
Henry J. M. Nouwen, The Wounded Healer (London: Image Books, 1979), p. 83.
16
Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, tr. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne
University Press, 1997), p. 41.
17
Ibid.
18
Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, tr. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh PA: Duquesne University Press, 1999), p. 153.
19
Emmanuel Levinas, Unforeseen History, tr. Nidra Poller (Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 2004), p. 20.
20
Jean Vanier, Man and Woman He Made Them (Homebush, NSW: St. Pauls, 1985), p. 113.
21
Ibid.
22
Emmanuel Levinas, “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” in Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 153.
23
Marie-Anne Lescourret, Emmanuel Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1992), p. 6.
15
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persecution of being bracketed out of existence and reduced to silence. He
related, “But the other men, called free, who had dealings with us or gave
us work or orders or even a smile—and the children and women who
passed by and sometimes raised their eyes—stripped us of our human
skin. We were subhuman, a gang of apes . . . beings without language.”24
However, in spite of the horror of his captivity, there suddenly appeared
“for a few short weeks” a sign of hope in encounter of “the last Kantian
in Nazi Germany,” a dog affectionately named “Bobby.”25 Th rough his
“friendly growling” and “without the brain needed to universalize maxims
and drives” upon which racism rests, Bobby became the grace and catalyst
to remind Levinas and his fellow prisoners “that we were men.”26 For if a
dog’s life of “jumping up and barking in delight,” of greeting in the morning and eagerly awaiting a return affi rms the value of affection rather than
the “dirtiest work” of humanity’s hatred for another, then the experience of
the goodness of “animal faith” signifies the need for a “pure nature,”27 the
very temperament of affectivity and language of otherness, to instill an
inherent moral, or indeed a spiritual, stance of seeking the good.
I want to suggest that the temperament of otherness is born out of the
state of loneliness. The wound of loneliness uncovers the “pure nature” of
affectivity and its relation to the language of otherness. The “pure nature”
reflects our condition of being made in the image and likeness of God
(Gen. 1:27) and of being Children of God, knowing God’s forgiveness and
love (1 Jn. 2:1–2). Loneliness helps to unveil our need for God as well as
uncovering a pathway toward an ethical and spiritual affectivity and solitude. Hillesum knew this well, when she reflected, “Life may be brimming
over with experiences, but somewhere, deep inside, all of us carry a vast
and fruitful loneliness wherever we go. And sometimes the most important
thing in a whole day is the rest we take between two deep breaths, or the
turning inward in prayer for five short minutes.”28 Altogether, we can suggest that the “pure nature” of affectivity “deep inside” resonates even
within loneliness, animating our deepest need to talk to God. For, while
the pain of isolation grows, we feel the vulnerability and fragility of “life
24

Levinas, “The Name of a Dog,” pp. 152–153.
Ibid., p. 153.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., pp. 151–153.
28
Hillesum, An Interrupted Life, p. 93.
25
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brimming over with experiences,” such as the death of a beloved, confl ict,
stress, overwork, sickness, and aging. Yet, where the pain and poverty of an
“inner emptiness”29 intensifies, there remains the very need to talk with
God, a “fruitful” way forward to respond to the terrifying grip of loneliness. Grieving the death of her beloved Spier, Hillesum exemplified such a
need to talk to God, revealing a redemptive pathway of affectivity to
assuage the lonely state of her soul:
“And talking to You, God. Is that all right? With the passing of people, I
feel a growing need to speak to You alone. I love people so terribly,
because in every human being I love something of You. . . . But now I need
so much patience, patience and thought, and things will be very difficult.
And now I have to do everything by myself. The best and the noblest part
of my friend, of the man whose light You kindled in me, is now with You.
What was left behind was a childish, worn-out husk in the two small
rooms in which I experienced the greatest and deepest happiness of my
life. I stood beside his bed and found myself standing before one of Your
last mysteries, my God.”30

Taking to heart the lonely depths of grief in prayer to God gave
Hillesum a robust courage to express, “I love people so terribly.” She
allowed her emotions to orient and animate her surprising, intimate, and
warm words and the “pure nature” of resilience. Her affectivity was thus
disposed toward prayerful, humble, and vulnerable expressions of faith,
hope, and love. Equally, her spirit recognized God’s presence as mystery
and the enduring gift of joy. To “love people so terribly” bears all the force
of the affectivity of the soul, transfigured into an ethical-spiritual horizon.31 Hillesum’s poverty of spirit and need for God suggest a sense of
otherness that seems to orient her emotions (from grief and loneliness to
“deepest happiness”) to dwell in the goodness and mystery of God’s
being, “The one-for-the-other.”32 We can learn from Hillesum that the
emotivity of agape reveals a heart of mercy, compassion, and joy (“deepest
29

Vanier, Man and Woman, p. 113.
Hillesum, An Interrupted Life, p. 198.
31
See Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), The Acting Person, tr. Andrzej Potocki, Analecta
Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, vol. 10 (Dorderecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 238–242.
32
Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 69.
30
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happiness”). Such affectivity and gravity of the heart unveil the goodness
of the human soul to be humane, giving hope to journey meaningfully
through experiences so difficult, unimaginable, and tragic, such as the
death of a beloved or the unbearable sadness of loneliness.
We can begin to appreciate that, where the emotional life is affected by
a spiritual life of ethics, experiences such as grief, loneliness, or even forgiveness begin to take on value. Commenting on how “to facilitate a good
experience of forgiveness,” John Monbourquette explained, “The most
important part of this experience is to follow the movements of your heart
closely, to learn about yourself as you are in your journey.”33 We can add
that, by following the movement of loneliness in “your heart closely”
through otherness, the weight of existence becomes bearable. Such beginnings of transformation could signify some spiritual vertigo, as it were,
where God’s inner word evokes the heights of mystery, as Hillesum
reminded us in her need to talk with God: “I feel so dizzy. ‘You have placed
me before Your ultimate mystery, oh God. I am grateful to You for that, I
even have the strength to accept it and to know there is no answer. That we
must be able to bear your mysteries.’ ”34
Within the “difficult adoration”35 of bearing God’s mysteries, we can
begin to see that, where the anguish of loneliness is met by an affectivity
of prayer and loving others, the search for the deepest source of life takes
on an ethical and spiritual quality. Such affectivity—in all its expression
of emotivity, meaning, and relationality—implies a movement of the self
toward the grace and “pure nature” of faith, hope, and love.

III. Spontaneity, Melancholy, and Vigilance
We have affi rmed that the state of loneliness acts as a catalyst to bring
affectivity and otherness into a movement toward revealing the ethical and
spiritual nature of our human condition. As we seek to highlight three
forms of affectivity—spontaneity, melancholy, and vigilance—we can also
think of them as taking up a position toward the state of loneliness, to draw
33

John Monbourquette, How to Forgive: A Step-by-Step Guide (Toronto: Novalis, 2000),

p. 69.
34
35

p. 145.

Hillesum, An Interrupted Life, p. 199.
Emmanuel Levinas, “Loving the Torah More than God,” in Levinas, Difficult Freedom,
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out its pain, wound, meaning, and transformation into the realm of otherness, a Realm of prayer, mercy, and love wherein the word of God comes to
mind. Spontaneity marks the fi rst movement, inasmuch as it helps to orient
and animate the affectivity of faith and conversion.

A. Spontaneity
Let us turn now to Karol Wojtyla, whose writings on emotional experiences may help to offer some direction and clarity toward drawing out the
sense of spontaneity from Levinas’s writings. Wojtyla wrote:
Emotional experiences—stirring emotions or excitements and in their
wake also the particular emotions and even passions—only happen in
man as subject. Their happening is spontaneous, and this means they are
not a product of personal efficacy and self-determination. We have thus to
assume that at the root of the emotive dynamism there must be a special
psychical efficacy, as otherwise it would be impossible to explain all that
in an emotive way happens in the man-subject. In a sense emotivity itself
signifies that spontaneous efficacy of the human psyche.36

Wojtyla pointed out that emotions are stirred spontaneously rather
than through the self ’s control and actions. In other words, something otherwise or beyond a person’s essence stirs emotions and passions. In terms
of emotions that reach an ethical and spiritual level, we can suggest with
Levinas that, through the other’s face, God’s word works in such a way as
spontaneously to stir the emotions, rupturing time into diachrony (“the
to-God of time”)37 and prophecy (“time itself in its patience”).38 Hence,
where loneliness assumes spontaneity, we have the foundation for the self
to take on the affectivity of conversion: an outpouring of ethical and spiritual transcendence, a “spontaneous efficacy of the human psyche,” or simply possessing the very need to talk to God. Just as meaningfully, Bernard
Lonergan related affectivity of spontaneity to falling in love, pointing out,
“the human subject . . . was transcendent affectively when he fell in love,
when the isolation of the individual was broken and he spontaneously

36

Wojtyla, The Acting Person, p. 243.
Levinas, Time and the Other, p. 118.
38
Ibid.
37
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functioned not just for himself but for others as well.”39 For Levinas, such
transcendent affectivity translates as “the devotion of a theology without
theodicy,”40 that is to say, the “ultimate intimacy” of being-for-the-other
without “preachment” or “any shadow of a consoling theodicy.”41
Let us look further at the affectivity of the psyche, in order to give more
clarity to the sense of spontaneity. We can suggest, for example, that, where
the affectivity of the psyche is oriented through a spontaneous stirring of
love and compassion, the self can come to a point of understanding suffering such as loneliness “as a gift,”42 facilitating the need to talk to God, as we
fi nd in Hillesum’s intimate sharing with God: “To think that one small
human heart can experience so much, oh God, so much suffering and so
much love, I am so grateful to You, God, for having chosen my heart, in
these times, to experience all the things it has experienced.”43 We see here
Hillesum’s “interhuman perspective”44 of nurturing suffering into the otherness of love and compassion rather than any rationalizations or thematizations of experience that speak more of the futility or the “uselessness”45
of suffering. In a sense, then, where we conceive of spontaneity as the emotional stirrings of development in the soul, we have the foundation for the
affectivity of the psyche to take on an ethical and spiritual horizon of faith,
hope, and love. Such a horizon begins with the integration and transcendence46 of conversion. Importantly, spontaneity helps to bring out the connection between the emotions and the psyche (the process of development,
transformation, and conversion) of the soul.
For Wojtyla, the psyche referred to the integration (transcendence) of
the acting person, and, although distinct, it remains in unity with the soma
(body), whereas the notion of the soul is highlighted as the enigmatic
“principle [“ultimate source”] of transcendence and integration.”47 In com39
Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996),
p. 289.
40
Levinas, Time and the Other, p. 120.
41
Emmanuel Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” in Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous: On
Thinking-of-the-Other, tr. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 99 and 100.
42
Philip Roderick, Beloved: Henri Nouwen in Conversation (Norwich, U.K.: Canterbury
Press, 2008), p. 8.
43
Hillesum, An Interrupted Life, p. 198.
44
Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” p. 100.
45
Ibid., p. 98.
46
Wojtyla, The Acting Person, pp. 220 and 256–258.
47
Ibid., p. 258.
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parison, Levinas was quite biblical in his tone by characterizing the psyche
as prophecy: “Prophecy would thus be the very psyche in the soul: the
other in the same, and all of man’s spirituality would be prophetic.”48 We
can begin to perceive that the other, through God’s word’s arising as an
ethical command of responsibility in the other’s face, plays an exacting role
to move the self spontaneously toward psychical change, patience, and
conversion. Prophecy, in the sense of hearing and holding the other’s fears,
needs, and hopes in the heart and mind, also takes the form of witness to
the In-fi nite (God-in-the-fi nite). Levinas described the state of witness as
“humility and admission,” adding, “it is made before all theology; it is
kerygma and prayer, glorification and recognition.”49 We can suggest, then,
that spontaneity grounds and initiates the affectivity of the emotions in the
diachrony of God’s grace of conversion. Therefore, spontaneity signifies
the affectivity of faith as we relate to the world through our “action” and
“att itudes” toward others.50 Further, spontaneity also helps to challenge
theology to be grounded in prayer and to be wary of any totalizations of
experience that seek to explain evil and suffering.
Taking up a Christian theological lens, we can imagine that, where a
spontaneous affectivity of faith emerges, the self seeks the Realm of God,
adoring and glorifying the Creator in prayer, participating in Christ’s
kerygma, and recognizing the role of the Spirit as the One who provokes
the epiphany and outpouring of revelation. Thus, spontaneity evokes an
ethical-spiritual integration and formation of God’s word’s bonding in the
psyche to open a pathway toward the integration and transcendence of
prophecy, namely, the humility, patience, prayer, and witness of the Realm
of God. In sum, we can deduce that spontaneity signifies the affectivity of
faith and conversion.

B. Melancholy
Reflecting on theodicy and suffering, Levinas portrayed a tone of melancholy to show the failure of using theodicy to explain suffering and
genocide. He lamented:

48

Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 149.
Ibid.
50
Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 1, ed. Robert M. Doran and
Robert C. Croken (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2010), p. 204.
49
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Perhaps the most revolutionary fact of our twentieth-century
consciousness—but it is also an event in Sacred History—is that of the
destruction of all balance between Western thought’s explicit and implicit
theodicy and the forms that suffering and its evil are taking on in the very
unfolding of this century. Th is is the century that in thirty years has
known two world wars, the totalitarianisms of right and left , Hitlerism
and Stalinism, the Gulag, and the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia.
Th is is the century that is drawing to a close in the obsessive fear of the
return of everything these barbaric names stood for: suffering and evil
infl icted deliberately, but in a manner no reason set limits to, in the exasperation of a reason become political and detached from all ethics.
Among these events the Holocaust of the Jewish people under the
reign of Hitler seems to me the paradigm of gratuitous human suffering,
in which evil appears in its diabolical horror. Th is is perhaps not a subjective feeling. The disproportion between suffering and every theodicy was
shown at Auschwitz with a glaring, obvious clarity.51

Thus, evidencing a pensive sense of sadness about humanity’s “barbaric” ways, Levinas set out to criticize and deconstruct the totalizing
forces that strive to explain evil, suffering, and God’s existence. These
impersonal rationalizations reveal more absurdity and horror than the
hope of encountering God’s word in the other’s face. Fitt ingly, Levinas has
taken us beyond the totality of being toward an immemorial (spiritual)
“ethical bond”52 of an outpouring of responsibility and compassion. Moreover, where his thought takes the form of “ethical sensibility”53 in the realm
of “the Kingdom of God,”54 we may describe his mood as an ethical or
spiritual melancholy, an interior loneliness, as it were, that transcends
into otherness, as we see in Hillesum’s patient search for God’s word to
grow inside of her “thinking heart of the barracks”:55
But I still suffer from the same old complaint. I cannot stop searching
for the great redeeming formula. For the one word that sums up everything
51

Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” p. 97.
Emmanuel Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical
Writings, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 141.
53
Levinas, “Useless Suffering,” p. 98.
54
Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 52.
55
Hillesum, An Interrupted Life, p. 199; emphasis in original.
52
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within me, the overflowing and rich sense of life. “Why did You not make
me a poet, oh God? But perhaps You did, and so I shall wait patiently until
the words have grown inside me, the words that proclaim how good and
beautiful it is to live in Your world, oh God, despite everything we human
beings do to one another.”56

Both Hillesum and Levinas evoked insight into the outpouring of melancholy in the face of the “evil” and “diabolical horror” of the Shoah. Their
ethical-spiritual character of melancholy uncovers an encounter with the
other’s pain57 and almost, as we can imagine, the voice of hope in Ps. 133:1,
“How very good and pleasant it is when kindred live together in unity!”
Signified within the melancholy of hearing God’s word in the other’s face
are the desire and confidence to oppose inhumanity as well as the hope
and courage to respond with substitution and compassion. In Christian
theological terms, the mood of melancholy signifies the hope to hear and
respond to the cry and outrage of “the poor, the crippled, the lame, and the
blind” (Lk. 14:13). As a result, the integration of melancholy into a spiritual
and ethical domain also gives rise to an eschatological expression of affectivity and otherness: the very hope to feast at Christ’s table in the Realm of
God and to hear Jesus’ word: “For I was hungry and you gave me food, I
was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you
welcomed me, I was naked and you gave me clothing, I was sick and you
took care of me, I was in prison and you visited me” (Mt. 25:35–36).

C. Vigilance
Levinas’s ethical metaphysics also generates a sense of vigilance. Vigilance (also identified as insomnia and wakefulness) oozes out like a wound
from his writings, unveiling a haunting starting point: a “stranglehold”58 of
evil provoking fear, threat, and insomnia.59 Comparably, Anthony Kelly
provided an apt description of the subject’s collision into “extinction”:60
“The nihilistic view of reality is fi xated in autistic materialist objectivism
56
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that refuses to allow the reality of the personal subject in oneself or in others.”61 Where the self ’s being is reduced to competitive self-interest, for
example, mutating into “forms of idolatry and cultural atheism,” it receives
the very “wages of sin” (Rom. 6:23), namely, death.62 Levinas characterized
this state, provoking the death of subjectivity (existence without being an
existent), as an anonymous and depersonalizing presence that he named
the “there is” [il y a]. 63 He wrote:
We are, thus, introducing into the impersonal event of the there is not
the notion of consciousness, but of wakefulness, in which consciousness
participates . . .
Wakefulness is anonymous. It is not that there is my vigilance in the
night; in insomnia it is the night itself that watches. It watches. In this
anonymous nightwatch where I am completely exposed to being all the
thoughts which occupy my insomnia are suspended on nothing. They have
no support. I am, one might say, the object rather than the subject of an
anonymous thought.64

We see that the “I” experiences a breakdown in which horror, threat,
and fear become so overwhelming that consciousness abandons the “I.” As
a consequence, the “I” takes up a “twilight” character of existence, more
object than subject—or, more radically, neither object nor subject.65
Even further, the “I” experiences a horrible transcendence, a surrealism
of sorts, where phenomena stop and melt in time, as in Salvador Dali’s 1931
oil painting, “The Persistence of Memory.” Where the objects of consciousness melt and disappear, the subject’s “extinction” becomes insomnia’s
curse.66 The horror of such surreal-like insomnia—the state where, for
example, flowers and trees, faces and friends, books and smart phones melt
from consciousness—premises a world of depression, forsakenness, and
worthlessness. As a result, an anonymous and depersonalizing state of
existence, which Levinas defi ned as the “there is,” makes its haunting presence known. Writing from the Westerbork transit camp in Holland, we
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could well imagine that Hillesum saw this fi rsthand when she stated, “We
are being hunted to death all through Europe . . .”67 Nor is it surprising
that Levinas’s development of the notion of the “there is” in his programmatic book, Existence and Existents, came only a few years after the end of
World War II. For Levinas, the “there is,” tearing subjectivity away into
anonymity, left the self in a state of lostness, “a sum of negativities,”68 where
“suffering, guilt, failure [and] disgrace”69 equaled the hell of “personal
worthlessness”70 and the destruction of hope. We can surmise that the
“there is” plays a part in accentuating the fear and horror of loneliness, an
existence without the fellowship of existents.
The effect of the Levinasian “there is” could also be compared to the
haunting authority of a dystopian society’s enforcing “an identity of being
the same.”71 In such a dystopian world, we could imagine that the self falls
into an insomnia of darkness, blind to the beauty of God’s creation.72 Here,
yet nowhere, the self is further lost in a vigilance of a consciousness overwhelmed with an insatiable hunger for the presence of its consuming,
totalizing thoughts and rationalizations as a means to leash the emotions
for its idolizations of experience. The self, now escaping into expressions of
acedia and the utter darkness of loneliness—having maxed out its credit,
so to speak—longs to rest in the false optimism that life is “all good.” However, as such optimism reaches “the end of its tether,”73 there remains hope
yet to rise out of its spiritual torpor and loneliness. For example, Levinas
wrote, “We can be more or less close to this limit situation. In certain
awakenings of delirium, in certain paradoxes of madness, we can surprise
this impersonal ‘consciousness’ into which insomnia sinks.”74 Hillesum
was just as grave in her att itude to human suffering amid the totality of
Nazism. Instead of falling into acedia, she wrote:
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Sometimes I might sit down beside someone, put an arm round a shoulder, say very litt le and just look into their eyes. Nothing was alien to me,
not one single expression of human sorrow. Everything seemed so familiar, as I knew it all and had gone through it all before. People said to me,
“You must have nerves of steel to stand up to it.” I don’t think I have nerves
of steel, far from it, but I certainly stand up to things. I am not afraid to
look suffering straight in the eyes. And at the end of each day, there was
always the feeling: I love people so much. Never any bitterness about what
was done to them, but always love for those who knew how to bear so
much although nothing had prepared them for such burdens.75

Hence, where resilience and hope emerge in spite of bitterness or a
blind optimism that falls into depression, the state of insomnia or wakefulness paradoxically becomes a place of formation and transformation.
Th is is where the self, facing “the excess of evil,”76 begins to emerge to the
near side of ethics, namely, to the affectivity of prayer and love, waiting
vigilantly for the revelation of God’s word of truth, beauty, and goodness.
Levinas explained that the catalyst for this change is the disturbance of
the other:
Insomnia—the wakefulness in awakening—is disturbed in the core of its
formal or categorical equality by the other, which tears away at whatever
forms a nucleus, a substance of the Same, identity, a rest, a presence, a sleep.
Insomnia is disturbed by the other who breaks this rest, breaks it from this
side of the state in which equality tends to establish itself. . . . Insomnia is
wakefulness, but a wakefulness without intentionality—dis-interested.77

As with Hillesum’s state of wakefulness and disinterestedness “to look
suffering in the eyes,” Levinas invited us to re-think our notion of “equality by the other.” In spite of political, social, economic, and even religious
agendas that seek to reduce the other to the same, there remains the call of
the In-fi nite (God-in-the-fi nite) to learn to “love people so much” through
disinterestedness—that is to say, an ethical-spiritual vigilance of beingfor-the-other before the mystery of God. Consequently, rupturing the
self ’s consciousness, the affectivity of such vigilance (insomnia) takes on
75
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the quality of “a wakefulness in awakening”—to be present to God’s word
in the other’s face, transforming bitterness into the endurance of love.
Beyond the presence of power over the other there arises a fecund time
for the formation of the self ’s ethical and spiritual life. Levinas described
such awakening as “the spirituality of the soul,”78 which we can exemplify
in the warm intimacy of Hillesum’s prayer to God. Her ethical-spiritual
awakening of affectivity underlines that loving others so profoundly is one
and the same as loving God. In Christian theological terms, we could suggest that the state of insomnia offers possible insight into the experience
of Holy Saturday, where the dead Christ, overflowing with the affectivity
of ethical-spiritual insomnia (vigilance and wakefulness), disturbs and
ruptures the consciousness of those lost in God-forsakenness with the disinterestedness of a responsibility (expiation) accentuated through the compassion of “loving people so terribly.”
It would not be surprising to imagine that to be disinterested—
responsible for the other—is demanding and difficult, especially where
one is touched by God to face the gravity of being-for-the-other. Th is is
because the nature of responsibility requires the formation of a spirituality of the soul through the vigilance of not being silent about the other’s
suffering, loneliness, and hunger. In 1957, Levinas wrote the essay “Freedom of Speech”79 to criticize Western culture for divorcing itself from the
“meaning of language.”80 Highlighting the need to be vigilant to speak
otherwise in the language of otherness, Levinas stated:
We have a closed language, and a civilization composed of aphasiacs.
Words have once more become the mute signs of anonymous infrastructures, like the implements of dead civilizations or the abortive acts of our
daily lives. By being coherent, speech has lost its speech. From this point
on, there is no longer any word that has the authority necessary to
announce to the world the end of its own decline.81

Levinas wrote these haunting words in response to the threat of communism’s spreading in Europe, to a political totalitarianism resting on an
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ontological horror of “an impersonal universe, a universe without language.”82 In response, we may ask what words may help to overcome the
threat of aphasia’s reducing human language to the horror of an anonymous presence of nothingness. Or, again, what words have “the authority
to announce” hope, healing, and the promise of peace and forgiveness “to
the world”? Let us suggest that, for example, Hillesum’s affectivity of
talking to God, “I love people so terribly, because in every human being I
love something of You,”83 bears the authority to “announce to the world”
that, “at the very moment where all is lost, everything in possible.”84

IV. Affectivity in Theology and Christian Living
Moving toward a sense of Christian praxis and living, let us look fi rst at
some of the challenges that remain to even reflecting on such an existence.
Pope Francis has warned of the temptation of acedia (torpor), “a distaste
for spiritual things,”85 among pastoral workers and religious men and
women, such “agents of evangelization” who “pray.”86 In contrast, Hillesum
advised, “Th ings come and go in a deeper rhythm, and people must be
taught to listen; it is the most important thing we have to learn in this
life.”87 We can envisage that blocking the will to listen speaks of “a heightened individualism, a crisis of identity and a cooling of fervour,”88 which
stands in stark contrast to Hillesum’s openness to share God’s beauty, as
she wrote from the Westerbork transit camp not long before her death at
Auschwitz: “My life has become an uninterrupted dialogue with You, oh
God, one great dialogue.”89 In Christian theological terms, we can suggest
that affectivity in human living arises in “a renewed personal encounter
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with Jesus Christ,”90 animated by the joy of the gospel (2 Cor. 6:10) “to
bring good news to the poor” (Lk. 4:18).
Let us imagine that one of the ways to appreciate the theological sense
of affectivity is to look at how it nurtures the Christian community to
become a place “to commence on the path towards forgiveness.”91 The
internal, formative effect of affectivity calls forth a desire to learn from
Christ to be poor in spirit and to talk to God. The desire to seek the Realm
of God underlines further “the “trinification” of human existence as it is
drawn into the love life of the divine persons, as members of Christ, temples of the Spirit, and children of the Father.”92 As we stand before God’s
mystery of love, our condition of loneliness transforms spontaneously into
otherness, enabling an affectivity of being a gift of self for others—as we
fi nd in Jesus’ statement, “In everything do to others as you would have
them do to you; for this is the law and the prophets” (Mt. 7:12).
Jesus’ language of the heart proclaims and witnesses to the formation
of Christian faith and hope for the divine Realm. From the spontaneity of
conversion from loneliness to otherness comes the outpouring of melancholy, of “searching for the great redeeming formula,”93 namely, to encounter the other’s suffering with the wisdom of the gospel that opens toward
the vigilance of love for others. We can suggest, then, that Jesus’ words
invite a Christian affectivity: adoring God the Father (a spontaneous
moment of transfiguration, initiating conversion and a renewed intimacy
of talking to God), breathing hope through the Holy Spirit (allowing the
gift of melancholy to facilitate the encounter of the other’s outrage, pain,
and suffering), and walking in the light of Christ (to love others vigilantly
and joyfully from the heart [Ps. 19:2 and Mt. 18:35]). Given that Jesus the
Christ is the forgiveness of sins, the challenge emerges to face the difficult
path of forgiveness and to learn to love people “so terribly” through a habitus or praxis of otherness that expresses the affectivity of resilience and the
deepest happiness of giving the promise of peace and healing to those who
are near and far (Is. 57:19 and Eph. 2:17).
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The appeal of affectivity in theology and Christian living signifies how
the joy of the gospel rather than, for example, the fear of loneliness or “the
slavery of sadness”94 “fi lls the hearts and lives of all who encounter
Jesus,”95 for the affectivity of being joyful in spite of sorrows (2 Cor. 6:10)
unveils courage and resilience to achieve, for example, unity in the midst
of confl ict. Given that Christian communities will experience tension and
confl ict, the challenge is to work toward achieving “a joy which is shared”
and to “face confl ict head on” as a means to work toward forgiveness and
reconciliation and not lose one’s bearings.96 However, for many, mutuality
and the bodiliness of sharing joy become impossible. Impulses arise simply to walk away from the confl ict, “wash their hands of it and get on with
their lives.”97
People become imprisoned within the bitterness of loneliness and end
up following a compass of “confusion and dissatisfaction,”98 rather than
allowing the melancholy of the moment spontaneously to nurture loneliness into the vigilance of love. Accordingly, where we open our hearts to
the peace of Christ (Eph. 2:14), made possible “through the blood of his
cross” (Col. 1:20), we discover a common ground to nurture the promise of
forgiveness and the hope for reconciliation.99 Francis, guiding the Church
toward hearing the joy of the gospel, exemplifies such a search for a common ground. Reflecting on how “unity prevails over confl ict,” he stated in
Evangelii gaudium, no. 228, “In this way it becomes possible to build communion amid disagreement, but this can only be achieved by those great
persons who are willing to go beyond the surface of the confl ict and to see
others in their deepest dignity. Th is requires acknowledging a principle
indispensable to the building of friendship in society: namely, that unity is
greater than confl ict.”
Francis has set out vigilantly to see “others in their deepest dignity.”
In effect, I want to suggest here that, in the affectivity “to go beyond the
surface of the confl ict,” we see the stirrings of an affectivity of vigilance
to build friendship in community. For Levinas, developing a sense of
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vigilance implies having suffered a stupor or trauma or overwhelming
surprise, namely, something unheard-of in everyday consciousness.100
Inspired by Levinas, we can think of the encounter with the risen Christ’s
word in the face of the other, producing a traumatic and turbulent
shock—a spontaneous stirring of emotions—orienting the affectivity of
conversion and otherness, the very offering of oneself “for-the-other.”101
From spontaneously responding to the overwhelming surprise of God’s
word—“that unity is greater than confl ict”—the self can feel the melancholy, shock, and threat of “fragmentation and breakdown,”102 as we see in
Hillesum’s resilient words of faith:
“How great are the needs of Your creatures on this earth, oh God.
They sit there, talking quietly and quite unsuspecting, and suddenly their
need erupts in all its nakedness. Then, there they are, bundles of human
misery, desperate and unable to face life. And that’s when my task begins.
It is not enough simply to proclaim You, God, to commend You to the
hearts of others. One must also clear the path toward You in them, God,
and to do that one has to be a keen judge of the human soul.”103

Facing the shock and turbulence of encountering the other’s poverty
and need, Hillesum was close to Francis, who would lament in E.G.,
no.229, “If hearts are shattered in thousands of pieces, it is not easy to create authentic peace in society.” The experience of melancholy, as we learn
from Hillesum and Francis, signifies together a prophetic hope and
demanding task to uncover God’s presence and “beauty,”104 to give good
news to the poor. As a result, we may begin to sense the overwhelming
force of affectivity to orient forgiveness and reconciliation within a Christian community and to exhort the necessity to be “a keen judge of the
human soul.”
In conclusion, where forgiveness is deepened by an affectivity of learning to appreciate the dignity, beauty, and value of the poor, the Christian
community takes courage to overcome the temptation to fall into a “closed
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language . . . of aphasiacs.”105 Such affectivity transforms into a promise
where we seek from the heart (Mt. 18:35) to offer the friendship of Christ
and the joy of the gospel to “the poor, the crippled, the lame, and the blind”
(Lk. 14:13). Altogether, through the turbulence of conversion to the Realm
of God (the spontaneity of faith); the shock and trauma of bearing the other’s pain, suffering, and outrage (the melancholy of hope); and the transcendence and joy of loving others (the vigilance of love)—Christian
theology can learn much from such Jewish thinkers as Levinas and
Hillesum. Accordingly, we can suggest that “human” affectivity becomes a
“humane” affectivity and existence, coming to rest in the simplicity of
talking to God and being open to nurture the grace of such intimacy in the
love of the poor and in listening and responding to their fears, needs, outrages, and hopes. In this way of following “the movements of your heart
closely,” 106 to be attentive even to the vulnerability of our isolated, lonely
condition, the poor “call us to love and waken within us what is most precious: compassion.”107
The more the Christian community learns to talk to God and listen to
the poor, the more it may be open to an affectivity of being poor in spirit
and living in the union of love rather than the discord of fear. We may then,
as a community of faith, growing in “greater maturity, compassion and
acceptance of self and others,”108 discover “the greatest and deepest happiness”109 of life, namely, the affectivity, humility, and joy of talking to God:
“I love people so terribly, because in every human being I love something
of You.” We can hope that a catalyst for such joy can be the fruit and goodness of Jews and Christians who sit down together, learn from one another,
and listen to the experiences and encounters of one another’s affectivity of
human living and talking to God.
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